NTSB Identification: ERA11FA219
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 30, 2011 in Greensboro, NC
Aircraft: BEECH 58, registration: N569JL
Injuries: 2 FatalNTSB Accident Report
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 30, 2011, at 1746 eastern daylight time, a Beech 58, N569JL, operated by Jet Logistics, Inc., was destroyed when it impacted trees and a residence while conducting an instrument approach to Piedmont-Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina. The certificated airline transport pilot and passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Wilmington International Airport (ILM), Wilmington, North Carolina, and was destined for Smith Reynolds Airport (INT), Winston Salem, North Carolina. The non-scheduled passenger flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.
According to the operator, the pilot departed the airplane’s base at Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU) about 0700, and repositioned the airplane to INT to pick up the passenger. They departed INT about 0900, and arrived in ILM about 1000, where the passenger conducted business for the day. The flight then departed ILM at 1622 to return the passenger to INT.
Review of preliminary air traffic control information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration, revealed that the pilot conducted a holding procedure while enroute INT, and during the hold, elected to divert to GSO. The pilot was cleared for the instrument landing system approach to runway 5L, and subsequently declared a missed approach before radar contact was lost.
The initial impact point was located in a wooded area approximately 2 miles from the runway 5L threshold, and was identified by several freshly cut tree branches. A wreckage path approximately 600 feet in length and oriented approximately 45 degrees magnetic extended through the wooded area. Fragments of the airplane, including portions of both wings, the empennage, flight control surfaces, and landing gear, were located along the wreckage path. The fuselage came to rest inside a residence and was largely consumed by post-impact fire. Both engines separated from their nacelles and were located within 50 feet of the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies exhibited s-bending, chordwise scratching, and leading edge polishing.
The 1754 weather observation at GSO included winds from 60 degrees at 9 knots, 1/4-mile visibility in light drizzle and fog, an overcast cloud layer at 100 feet, temperature 6 degrees C, dew point 5 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.83 inches of mercury. A surface visibility of one-half mile was also noted.|
Accident location as determined fom coordinates included in official report. This map has not been reviewed by NTSB.
Available information indicated that the pilot had a rest opportunity of 7 hours 44 minutes the night before the accident, which was close to her reported sleep need of 8 hours per night. In addition, although the pilot had been on duty for 13 hours by the time of the accident, she received a 5-hour break at an intermediate stop before she began preparing for the accident flight. It is possible she used some of this time to obtain additional rest. Furthermore, the accident occurred at a time of day that is normally associated with high levels of alertness. Thus, the available evidence does not support a conclusion that the pilot’s performance was degraded by fatigue.
No blood sample was available for toxicological testing, but tissue specimens were used for ethanol and drug assays. No ethanol was found in any tissue. Sertraline was detected in the liver. Since blood levels for butalbital (detected in the liver and kidney) and promethazine (detected in the kidney) (both of which can cause sedation and impair mental and/or physical ability) were not available, it was not possible to assess the pilot’s level of impairment at the time of the accident. Based on the tissue levels of butalbital, promethazine and sertraline, it was likely that, at some point the day before, or the day of, the accident flight, the pilot ingested these medications. Whether actual blood levels of butalbital and/or promethazine were great enough to interfere with the pilot’s aeronautical decision-making or flying skills at the time of the accident could not be determine